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PREFACE
The reorientation of NASA in the post-Apollo period has presented to
the Agency problems as serious in magnitude as those: encountered in the
rapid buildup of OMSF shortly after the enunciation of the Apollo Program,
but of an entirely different nature. These problems are the consequence
of a sharp decline in support of the Space Program, expecially where manned
flight is concerned. NASA is trying to cope with the agonizing adjustments
to its program plans and organizational structure made necessary by the.
conditions imposed on it by Congress and the Administration.
NASA has many internal resources available for providing and analyzing
scientific and management information. At the same time, though, it has
always recognized the value of an external view of itself by unbiased ob-
servers, as an input to and aid in the decision-making process concerning
near- and long-term planning. This report is the result of an investiga-
tion by a four-man interdisciplinary team from Syracuse University during
1972. The team had acquired a knowledge base during the prior four-year
period, in which a candid relationship between Syracuse University and OMSF
had evolved.
The research team conducted a large number of interviews at OMSF in
Washington and at the three field centers, gathering facts, opinions and
suggestions concerning the current problems that OMSF faces. The practice
of recording interviews did not inhibit those interviewed from being frank
and spontaneous in their remarks, due to the degree of confidentiality that
had been accorded similar interviews by the team in the past. Where quota-
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tions appear in this report they are anonymous and are representative of
prevalent attitudes encountered.
The report itself is essentially a distillation of the many opinions
gathered in the field, moderated by the knowledge and judgment of the
group of investigators. The ideas, recommendations and suggestions in
this report have survived a very rigorous process of debate and critique
among the members of the team.
The group was indeed fortunate in securing the cooperation of many
intermediate and high-level management personnel, and wishes to express
its sincere appreciation to those participants.
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I. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
NASA will continue to undergo a number of important changes which will
require new management approaches by OMSF. Brief statements of our recom-
mendations in this regard are summarized below. A more detailed discussion
of them can be found in the text of this report.
1. Despite all of the resistance which may be encountered, NASA should
make a major effort to persuade Congress and the Executive Branch that stable,
long-term funding is essential for the maximum utilization of NASA's resources
and programs.
2. Based on the Apollo experience, NASA is now in a better position to
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of various management and informa-
tion systems used in programmatic undertakings. There is a consensus at the
field centers that many of the Apollo management systems are too elaborate,
too sophisticated, and too expensive to apply efficiently to the newer,
emerging NASA projects.
3. The need for program planning by OMSF will be greater than ever
before. In contrast to the early phases of the Apollo programs, projects
must be clearly defined early in the development cycle. Early definition
of performance specifications, cost, schedules and interface requirements
minimizes ultimate project documentation. In Apollo, because of schedule
pressures, a number of key decisions were delayed which resulted in large
incremental costs in the development cycle. There should be a strong em-
phasis on freezing project designs once requirements are met. The luxury
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of engineering improvements which contribute only marginally to a project
should come under greater scrutiny.
4. The design philosophy within OMSF should be altered to take into
account decreased reliability and redundancy requirements in unmanned pro-
grams or experimental packages and even in non-critical aspects of manned
missions. The enunciation of such a change must be followed by continued
review of individual design efforts to revise habits acquired in the Apollo
program.
5. In some areas of OMSF a feeling of uncertainty about both NASA's
future and its immediate proposed programs is evident. Three somewhat
interrelated factors appear to contribute to this feeling: a) NASA's bud-
get restrictions; b) the recent RTFs experienced by NASA; c) the lack of
an identifiable long-range plan at the field centers. We believe that a
multidimensional planning system can overcome some of these problems. In
the past, long-range planning activities have been too far removed from
the "bowels" of the OMSF organization.
6. NASA's ability to cope successfully with the future will depend
largely upon NASA's long-range planning ability. We recommend that long-
range planning receive the highest support and visibility within the Agency.
Without primary and contingency plans it will be increasingly difficult for
the various areas of NASA to be responsive. A long-range plan is seen by
many as one of the major means by which Headquarters can communicate with
the field centers. Two elements of NASA's planning system should be tech-
nology forecasting and socio-political forecasting.
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7. What might be called a strategic organizational analysis system
should bje implemented whereby every work-unit within OMSF is appraised for
its current and future contribution to NASA's missions and objectives.
Those units which .do not serve any current or strategic purpose should be
eliminated or their focus changed. In the same way, NASA should reduce
its holdings of cost generating assets after an audit of NASA facilities
indicates that they are not likely to be of value in planned programs.
8. Headquarters should stimulate a trend for which there is increas- .
ing evidence: personnel at the operating level of the field centers are
gaining a greater awareness of what the other NASA field centers are doing.
We see this as a positive sign that NASA personnel are becoming increas-
ingly alert to the importance of inter-center coordination. To a large
extent this has been forced by the nature of the Shuttle Program.
9. NASA must closely examine the current organizational arrangements
at the OMSF field centers and ask whether they are satisfactory for hew
operational modes. Many doubts have been expressed whether the current
rigid departmentalization of the technical research arid development areas
at the field center level is conducive to efficient response to shifting
priorities. NASA is in an era where fluid organizational relationships can
pay high dividends.
10. NASA, largely based on the Apollo experience, presents an image to
the layman that it can do almost anything -- but only at a staggeringly
high cost. Yet, for much of the nation it is the extravaganza which keeps
NASA in the public eye. Thus, we believe that NASA will continually be
faced with the challenge of maintaining visibility as an Agency. There
are a number of options open to NASA. First, the Agency can use sound
marketing principles to seek from relevant constituencies support for its
future activities. Second, NASA can emphasize that high R & D costs are
justified by showing the social, economic and political benefits which are
derived 'from the national investment in NASA. Third, NASA can emphasize
the "spin-offs" which are developed from NASA's R & D efforts and stress
their importance to society through advanced technology.
11. NASA's desire to expand the applications of its space and mana-
gerial technologies must be monitored closely in order not to stretch
NASA's capabilities. In working with urban administrators, for example,
NASA should be a participant but should not assume the lead role. In
essence, NASA should be careful not to over-sell its problem-solving capa-
bilities in areas too far removed from its major missions.
12. Where there is a clear pay-rpff to NASA and where NASA's capa-
bilities and technologies can be effectively utilized, NASA should consider
aggressively seeking new contracts from others. In dealing with other
organizations, countries, and agencies, however, it will be necessary for
management at all levels to be convinced that NASA can and should play a
role in solving non-space technological problems. Further, it will be
important for NASA management to make clear that such activities are legiti-
mate pursuits and that they will be rewarded by the Agency.
13. OMSF management is faced with the problem of disparities among
the work loads at its field centers. Relative to the too other centers,
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the task assignments for MSFC in current OMSF activities are small. To
remedy this circumstance, we recommend that both KSC and MSC be encouraged
to utilize the technical labs at Marshall for general in-house technical
support for their respective center program responsibilities.
14. MSC as .lead center in Shuttle has an awesome responsibility. To
assist MSC with its mission we recommend that the vast experience base for
monitoring technical contracts out-of-house at Huntsville be utilized by
MSC.
15. The Program Development Directorate at MSFC lacks any coherent
focus. To remedy this situation and to help OMSF to better plan for the
operational phase of Shuttle, we recommend that Program Development be
reoriented to Shuttle User Development. It would be the responsibility of
this Directorate to coordinate arid support all Shuttle user-related activity
both within and outside NASA.
16. The entire philosophy of protecting "manpower spaces" is detri-
mental. Regardless of the resistance, it is important for NASA to elimin-
ate or reduce this barrier to organizational flexibility. Under the current
system both programmatic and functional needs for flexible manpower assign-
ments suffer. A Manpower Advisory Council should be established in OMSF,
comprised of Headquarters and field center high-level personnel, to facili-
tate the shifting of manpower among the various Programs and Directorates
as requirements change with time.
17. The lead center mode of program management should be used for a
complex program with extensive interdependence of parts that requires
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appreciable use of the diversity of capabilitie's existing in various centers,
It cannot be recommended universally because of its numerous disadvantages.
The lead center management concept is recommended, where suitable, primarily
because it focuses management operations at an operating center with sub-
stantial technological and project management resources and thereby removes
the need for large support offices at Headquarters. In addition, this
management mode forces much-needed inter-center communication at the middle
management levels, and it should strengthen control of complex interface
problems.
18. Very careful consideration must be given to the selection of a
lead center whether for the management of one large program or as an ad-
visory center for a group of related programs. Among the dangers inherent
in lead center management are: a) management by equals; which engenders
certain resentments; b) concentration of resources and capabilities at
one center at the expense of others; and c) loss of input for alternative
designs and concepts.
19. OMSF might consider employing the advisory lead center type of
office instituted for Communications at MSFC for emerging programs. This
retains some of the advantages of a managerial lead center while avoiding
some of the dangers. However, it contains its own set of disadvantages.
20. In delegating responsibility for technical integration of a large
contract to the prime contractor, OMSF must retain for itself full, mana-
gerial control of integration.
_y. - 7 -
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21. In.the long run, it should be advantageous to maintain as clear
a distinction as possible among OMSF centers in their roles and areas of
competence for reasons of economy and to strengthen rather than diffuse
expertise.
22. It is possible that the designation of field centers as belong-
ing to OMSF or any other NASA office could be discontinued to increase
flexibility in resource utilization and to broaden financial support for
the individual centers. It is recommended that contingency plans be. formu-
lated which recognize this possibility.
23. There has been no unified thrust in OMSF in the area of. new pro-
gram development. While NASA R & D for new programs should definitely
remain at the field centers, we see the need for a stronger integration
and coordination role by Headquarters in new program development. Head-
quarters should also be a catalyst.
24. NASA should exert greater control over its contractors to acceler-
ate their conversion from production to R & D modes. The procurement of
relatively large numbers of items of a given design is not appropriate to
current and future programs.
25. NASA, and particularly OMSF, must strongly avoid fiscal, dependence
on the Department of Defense budget. Its civilian posture and its general
autonomy must not be compromised.
26. NASA should take steps now to correct the misleading publicity
concerning the cost and capability of the Space Shuttle Program. For
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reasons beyond the control of NASA or OMSF, budget curtailments have re-
vised expectations for Shuttle, particularly in the cost to put a pound
in orbit. Failure to correct the public record now may damage NASA's
credibility for the future.
II. THE NEAR-TERM NASA SCENARIO
The plans and actions of any organization depend not only upon its
own perception of internal factors, but upon external conditions --that
LH to say, upon the total scene or setting of the organization in the
broadest sense. NASA will continue to undergo a number of transitions in
management and operations which will be directly influenced by NASA's own
desires, and by the uncertainty and turbulence in NASA's environment.
This section briefly summarizes the various factors which will affect
NASA in ±he near future, in the judgment of the Syracuse Study Group.
A. CHANGE IN FOCUS . .
NASA is at a point where the intensity of public support
has significantly changed. The Shuttle Program has not
engendered the public support and excitement that Apollo
did.
In the near future there is not likely to be a program
which will have a high, clearly-defined national priority,
like Apollo.
There will be an abandonment of NASA's "single focus"
image. NASA is entering an era where it. will be neces-
sary to deal with varied constituents making diverse
demands.
-- Manned space flight is no longer the predominant activity
in NASA. The OMSF development centers will become in-
creasingly involved with OAST, OSS, OTDA, and OA. Thus
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the distinctions between manned and unmanned activi-
ties will be much less clear than they traditionally
have been.
In project control, priorities will change from the
"performance, schedule, cost" order of the Apollo era
to a "performance, cost, schedule" ranking in the more
austere post-Apollo years. Even design objectives will
sometimes be sacrificed for cost reductions. Concurrent-
ly, NASA design philosophy will tend toward the acceptance
of higher failure probabilities in order to optimize the
total costs in non-man rated hardware.
A larger number of smaller projects will be undertaken
concurrently by OMSF than in the past decade. This re-
quires more technical support from the centers despite
fewer personnel and reduced funds.
B. BUDGET RESTRICTIONS
For the immediate future NASA will continue to be faced
with the dilemma of operating within a minimal budget.
I
There will be demands for increased Congressional bud-
get appropriations from all areas of the government.
NASA will continue to feel the intense competition for
appropriations during this decade. Barring unforeseen
circumstances, NASA's funding levels during the 1970's
- 11 -
will most likely remain close to current absolute fund-
ing levels. This implies a considerable reduction of buy-
ing power and slippage in NASA's priority as measured by
a reduced percentage of the Gross National Product.
Although NASA is a civilian agency primarily, it also
has a secondary role of contributing where possible to
the national defense. As long as NASA had specifically
publicized goals such as a manned lunar landing, the
Agency remained primarily identified with non-military
activities. Currently, however, NASA could benefit from
DOD support, but might then have difficulty maintaining
its civilian orientation.
C. PLANNING
NASA is entering an operational era where cost/benefit
justification of various progrms will be mandatory. This
is true because of restricted budgets and the tendency,
therefore, to carefully scrutinize budget items. NASA
will have to recognize the need to match its programs to
broader societal priorities.
Planning cycles of 10-15 years will replace the shorter,
crash-type Apollo program planning activity.
With the prospects of an extended period of peace and a
more stable economy, effective and reliable long-range
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planning can be anticipated for NASA. NASA can benefit
from these trends in that it may be easier for the Execu-
tive Branch and Congress to "order" national priorities.
NASA's future programs will be defined, implemented and
controlled more in line with the traditional industrial
R & D methods. In effect, more classical, phased devel-
opment will take place with a careful evaluation of pro-
gram alternatives in terms of mission objectives and
hardware. Conformance to a constant spending pattern
will be necessary even at the expense of increased
operational costs.
NASA may find its credibility seriously damaged by cir-
cumstances beyond its control. The initial estimates
of only $100 per,pound to put Shuttle payload.in orbit
went far in obtaining public and Congressional support
for the program. The figure was apparently based on a
reuseable system with many flights per unit and a rela-
tively high frequency of launch. Unfortunately, budget
considerations required drastic revisions in design in
order to reduce initial development costs. As a conse-
quence, the cost per launch has now been projected at a
higher level. Furthermore, with the reduced operating
budgets now envisioned, the projected frequency of
launch needed for the anticipated economics wi. 1.1. not
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be possible. These two conditions imposed on NASA from
outside mean that the cost per pound in orbit will be
much larger than initially advertised. When it becomes
obvious through Congressional hearings and other channels
that the cost projection will not be achieved, NASA will
be held accountable. To prevent a possible loss of confi-
dence, NASA and particularly OMSF should gradually inform
the public about the real costs of experiments in space
and the reasons for the change. Some adverse reaction
now may protect the Agency's future.
D. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
It is expected .that future programs, and especially
Shuttle, should benefit from the Apollo experience.
There is considerable evidence that NASA has learned much
from both the successes and the mistakes made in the
management of Apollo. It is incumbent upon OMSF to
demonstrate the effective use of managerial and techni-
cal systems laboriously evolved during Apollo.
The organizational center of power at each OMSF field
center should now be more nearly equidistant from the
program management and the engineering sides of the house.
This trend should promote a better working relationship
between program/project management and the technical
areas of NASA.
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NASA's OMSF management is faced with the problem of a
disparity between the work loads at the field centers.
While the roles of MSC and KSC are rather clear for the
next few years, the role of MSFC is not. The eventual
role of MSFC will largely depend upon three variables:
1) the ability of MSFC to be innovative and responsive
to both OMSF and unmanned opportunities; 2) the degree-
of participation of MSFC in the Shuttle program; and
3) the development of a payload management capability
by MSFC or other long-range roles yet to be defined.
E. REVISED ROLE
Because of the demands of new programs, NASA will be
increasingly required to deal effectively with a num-
ber of complex interfaces within and external to the
Agency. NASA will thus be required to be more adept at
program integration. The increasing complexity of
physical (technical) interfacing will demand more effec-
tive managerial interfacing and integration.
The Soyuz Project will be important to NASA in terms
of national and international public relations and
visibility, but it is not likely that this is the begin-
ning of a major trend toward international cooperation
in space.
- 15 -
NASA will have an opportunity to assist the United States
Ln its current balance of payments problem, as recently
noted by Dr. James Fletcher. The potential exists for
NASA's capabilities to be focused on international as
well as national needs in the areas of global sensing
and surveillance, earth resources, measurements and in-
strumentation. NASA can continue to be a major source,
catalyst and disseminator of new technology which can be
applied to new products and processes.
III. ORGANIZATION
A. FIELD CENTERS
I. The Lead Center Concept
a. Hackground. The most significant recent management policy decision
in OMSF has been the establishment of a lead center role in program manage-
ment. The lead center concept is not new in NASA, but for OMSF it represents
a radical departure from the management mode of the Apollo program under which
most current OMSF personnel have operated for more than a decade. The shift,
therefore, has not gone unnoticed at any level in the Manned Space Flight cen-
ters, drawing comments of satisfaction and great expectation from some quarters
but skepticism, if not foreboding, in others.
In our interviews through the Summer of 1972, this broad spectrum of
reaction to questions about lead center operation depended somewhat on which
center we were visiting, but it resulted also in part from the fact that "lead
center" implied different things to different people. Of course, at that time,
its full implication for the Space Shuttle Program could not be foreseen. It
is still too early to expect that all fears of the unknown have been removed.
We believe that, despite the usefulness of this management mode, there
are legitimate objections to the lead center role and that these must be bal-
anced against the immediate and long-range advantages. MSC's announced
position as a lead center for the Space Shuttle Program is the most clear-
cut lead center role in OMSF, but there are and have been other examples
worth examining. .
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b. Center Insulation in the Apollo Program. Direction of the Apollo
program was concentrated in Washington. Of course, at the highest levels
of center management there was extensive interaction among the three cen-
ters through the Management Council and the Level II review boards. But
this management level dealt primarily with broad policy decisions. There
was a surprising degree of insulation at the project manager level and be-
low. In essence, the three major Manned Space Flight Centers operated as
lead centers (though the term was not used) in the clearly distinguishable
aspects of the program. MSFC was assigned lead role for booster hardware,
MSC for the spacecraft and for astronaut training, and KSC for launch opera-
tions. Headquarters, with the aid of intercenter panels and control boards,
exercised overall program control and coordination. This mode required the
buildup of a sizeable HQ management and technical staff to monitor and
direct Apollo activities at the centers.
c. Quasi-Lead Center Role in Skylab. Towards the end of the Apollo
program, attention turned to the organizational demands of new programs.
As the Skylab program developed, overlapping the operational phase of the
Apollo program, a large percentage of Skylab's development work was assigned
to the Marshall Space Flight Center whose development work for Apollo was
well past its peak. Program control authority was still exercised in the
Skylab office at Headquarters, however, and MSFC's role was not that of
lead center although many thought of it in those terms. Certainly there
is some justification in thinking of one center as "lead center" when its
responsibilities are clearly greatest and its design decisions shape the
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program. Perhaps this "quasi-lead center" role could be characterized as
"technical lead center".
Some managers at the Manned Spacecraft Center were concerned about
the strong influence MSFC was having on what they felt was very largely
an astronaut-oriented undertaking with all the training and life-support
aspects that this implied and in which they felt themselves to be most
competent, but they were much too busy with their part of the Apollo pro-
gram at that time to raise a serious objection. Nevertheless, resentments
were voiced.
d. Managerial Lead Center Role in Shuttle. With the establishment
of a full-fledged Space Shuttle Program, the management mode definitely
shifted to the lead center concept. MSC was eventually given major, al-
though not ultimate, management responsibility for the program, even for
those components of research and development work to be done or contracted
for by MSFC. The Shuttle program was clearly going to be a long-range ef-
fort. Both MSFC and MSC had been thinking for some time of the technical
problems involved. By the time the decision was made that a lead center
would be selected for Shuttle, the Apollo program was in its last phases
and was well past any major demands on the research and development capa-
bilities of those two centers. Both were in a position to compete strongly
for the role of lead center, and both saw the attainment or loss of that
role as the determinant to their own future in manned space activities as
well as in the whole Agency. Indications are that the intercenter competi-
tion was fierce and the resentments and even antagonisms engendered may
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last a long time. That is not to say that the competition itself was not
fruitful, but the negative aspects cannot be ignored.
It is important to avoid a simplistic view of the extent to which the
lead center role of MSC has decentralized management of the Shuttle program.
There is still a Space Shuttle Program Office within OMSF at Headquarters.
Its Director and the Associate Administrator for OMSF undoubtedly can be
reached for a review of any major decision. Nevertheless, the strong be-
lief is that MSC as the lead center for this large program can exercise
broad authority over any other center associated with the program. For
the first time in OMSF, one center (MSEC)'had been placed in a subordinate
position to another (MSC) in the management hierarchy.
e. Advantages of Lead Center Management. In the following discussion
of advantages and the later discussion of disadvantages in the establish-
ment of a lead center for a program or group of programs, the prime concern
is with the managerial lead center role of MSC in the Space Shuttle program.
-- Reduction in Headquarters Personnel. Certainly one of the clear
motives in a shift to management through lead centers is to avoid the build-
up of personnel at Headquarters. Based on the Apollo experience, it seems
adviseable that Headquarters now should truly be composed of top-level
decision makers, men with ultimate authority and responsibility, with staffs
lean enough to allow rapid and reliable communication without excessive
duplication of roles and efforts.
-- Closing the Gap Between Top Management and the Operating Centers.
While ultimate program authority will remain at Headquarters in Washington
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in present lead center schemes, the management level Immediately below will
be located at the lead center. That center functions as an operating center
where detailed program control, component design, test evaluation, and daily
management are accomplished. This will keep second-level management in
direct and continuous communication with all elements of the program. We
believe this will provide a more flexible response capability for problem
solving. Operational interfaces with the prime contractors occur through
field centers and management decisions regarding established contracts
should be made at that level. It would seem appropriate to have all Control
Boards below Level 0 meeting at the lead center so that while broad policy
decisions are made at Headquarters, all detailed program decisions are made
at the lead center. ;
-- Retain Staff Support Technical Experts Close to Their Base of
Competence. A technical man removed from the day-to-day environment of his
colleagues who are deeply involved in research and development quickly loses
his high level of proficiency. To keep abreast of developments to the ex-
tent that he himself can be a reliable critic and advisor while in the Wash-
ington program office, he must gather around him additional support personnel,
They, in turn, are then removed from the continuous growth evident in an
operating center. To the extent that they can keep themselves thoroughly
immersed in developments, they must inevitably be duplicating efforts of
others.
Program managers need the most competent technical support continuously
at hand. In the Apollo program, there was an attempt to maintain various
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offices of expertise in Washington. This was understandable when the
development of management methods was going on in parallel with the devel-
opment of the essential technology. Much has been learned since then.
Headquarters program offices should now be able to function with fewer
technical advisors in their own offices and reply on the competence of
field center program managers who have ready access to in-depth technical
support.
-- Preservation of the Special Competence of Individual Centers. If
Headquarters carefully assigns lead center roles in accordance with the
established and demonstrated capabilities of the centers, then it will be
possible for each center to strengthen its existing resources in one or
another specialty. This requires that lead center assignments be rotated
so that no center that is important to NASA's long-range objectives loses
its technical and managerial capabilities. Certainly there are many other
considerations, especially current work loads at the various centers. But
the frantic buildup days of a decade ago are not likely to return. Pro-
grams will be developed and authorized at a slower pace, and key management
decisions such as lead role selection can be made with the deliberation
they deserve.
-- Elimination of Duplication of Effort and Competence. Rather than
try to surpass all other centers in all ways, a lead center must be pre-
pared to utilize the resources of the others to the greatest extent possible,
Whether or not this will really occur depends on the skill with which top
NASA and OMSF management handles the designation of lead center roles and
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remains prepared to support each center in its area of acknowledged exper-
tise.
For fully effective operation, NASA must not be a collection of un-
related, redundant centers. With the recognition that various areas are
adequately supported in other centers and that whichever center might be
designated as lead center another can be delegated the responsibility for
the parts of the program it is capable of handling, each center should be
willing to acknowledge another as having primary competence in certain
fields.
Improved Center-to-Center Communication. As the lead center is
forced to deal with other centers working on the same program, communica-
tions between centers must increase in frequency and scope. This research
team was surprised in its study of the Apollo program to discover how un-
informed managers and engineers at all levels in the Manned Space Flight
centers were concerning the activities within other centers. This ignorance
was particularly evident in matters of management. It may have been less
serious in the dissemination of strictly technical information since avenues
existed for this purpose, but in the utilization of administrative and mana-
gerial knowledge there was very little interchange.
Perhaps Apollo had sufficiently few real interfaces to allow this
situation to persist with no excessive loss in efficiency. Certainly that
is not so in the Space Shuttle program, and it is not likely to be so in
others. Furthermore, only a minimum of duplication in effort is likely to
be tolerable in the future. As well as avoiding excessive trial-and-error
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duplication on the way to the discovery of effective courses of action,
this forced intercourse should also engender a greater sense of respect
and trust among individuals performing similar tasks at different centers.
In fact, the extreme insularity of the two centers has already been broken.
Our interviews in 1972 disclosed, in limited instances, a growing awareness
in both MSC and MSFC of each other's strengths and a certain amount of
grudging respect that had developed during the early negotiations between
the two centers in connection with the Space Shuttle program.
Strengthened Control of Complex Interfaces. When a program such
as Shuttle contains complex interfaces such that any slight variation in
one element impacts the design parameters of another being developed else-
where, the coordination of activities and decisions through a lead center
with its in-depth capabilities plus program authority becomes more and
more desirable. Where the interfaces among the component parts of a pro-
gram are minimal or simple, the lead center role is not so important. Each
center, taking responsibility for its own part of the program, can report
to and take direction from Headquarters as in the Apollo program. No one
can delineate exactly what degree of interface complexity warrants or
demands lead center management^ but this is certainly a major considera-
tion.
-^ Operating Center Contractor Control. Through the Apollo program
the various centers became adept at negotiating contract changes with con-
tractofs. At this stage in NASA's maturity, it is perhaps unnecessarily
cumbersome to bring Headquarters into so many NASA/contractor relationships.
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With the location of higher level management and the supporting technical
resources at the lead center, it should be in a better position than Head-
quarters itself to evaluate change proposals and change requests. The
man in day-to-day contact with contractors on detail should be best able
to work with the contractors in evaluating progress and deficiencies.
This degree of detailed knowledge can never be moved to Headquarters.
f. Disadvantages in Lead Center Management. The following disadvan-
tages relate especially to the role of MSC in the Space Shuttle program:
Management by Equals. Resentments are always engendered when
authority and control over one part of an organization are exercised by
another part that is at an equal level in conventional organizational hier-
archy. Lead center management sets up just such a situation. The fact
that a higher level program office exists at Headquarters does not make
this any less distasteful when in fact one center must take direction
from, must accept whatever limited responsibility is assigned by, and must
be continuously accountable to a sister center. Regardless of how care-
fully the lead center is selected, the others will not perceive or acknowl-
edge it to be superior either technologically or in management capability.
Parts of NASA that have operated in one version or another of lead
center management in the past may be quite accustomed to reporting to
other centers. This is not so in the two Manned Space Flight centers,
MSC and MSFC, which throughout the Apollo program were very largely inde-
pendent of each other. Each was in effect autonomous, reporting upwards
but seldom horizontally. Each developed a justifiable pride in its own
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abilities but at the same time some degree of suspicion and mistrust of :
the other, born of past rivalries and regrettable ignorance.
— Domination of NASA by One Center. The reason that the selection
of one or another center as lead center for the Shuttle program assumed
such importance in the eyes of all personnel at both MSC and MSFC was that
this was the only big, long-range program for OMSF in the foreseeable
future. The lead center for the one well-funded manned program could be-
come the center that dominates the whole Agency.
Failure to be selected as lead center for Shuttle became a demoral-
izing blow for MSFC. The significance of morale throughout NASA can never
be ignored. The high morale of the 1960's played a tremendous part in the
outstanding success of the Apollo program. It is doubtful whether NASA's
programs, with such technological complexity and risk, can ever operate
with the acceptable lower level of commitment evident in other government
agencies where failure, though perhaps more serious to the nation, is less
dramatic.
-- Atrophy of Other Centers. The domination of NASA by one center
endangers the continuation of the others. Each center must be maintained
above some critical level of financial support and activity or it can
quickly lose its competence. As experienced men leave they will not be
replaced by the needed dynamic younger men. Without continuous experience
in contract management, any center would soon become incapable of assuming
the direction of large contracts in the future. Without challenging re-
search and development work, the engineering capabilities would soon
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degenerate.
If there were to be a large number of relatively small programs phasing
in and out at a fairly steady rate so that each major center could be given
the lead role frequently, no one center would come to be regarded as the
key NASA center. But this is not the case, in short, should one center be
the only real lead center for some years, the others would be neglected and
their usefulness irretrievably lost.
-- Loss of Alternative Proposals. It has been an advantage to NASA
in general and OMSF in particular to have alternative proposals for major
or minor aspects of a program flowing to Headquarters from more than one
center for evaluation. In fact, the existence of more than one center and
the rivalry among them has stimulated individuals and centers to sponsor
alternative schemes.
With the management and evaluation of a program or a number of pro-
grams in one area by a lead center, Headquarters may be deprived of the
opportunity to criticize adequately. This will not necessarily be so.
It depends on the ppen-mindedness with which the lead center itself en-
courages and evaluates inputs from elsewhere, and it depends on the strength
and decisiveness of Headquarters itself insisting on a free flow of informa-
tion, adequate financing of other centers, and its own prerogatives.
Favoritism in Task Assignments. The fear that a lead center for
a program or for a class of programs may show favoritism in the assignment
of roles to others, and indeed, may keep a disproportionate amount of R & D
work or contract supervision to itself, has been expressed repeatedly by
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some NASA managers we have interviewed. However, if Headquarters were to
insist on certain equitable task assignments beyond giving broad guide-
lines, this intrusion on lead center authority could be rightfully resented
and could negate some of the advantages inherent in decentralization. To
say that these are groundless fears and that there are sufficient external
controls over lead center decisions to avoid abuse of prerogatives does
not satisfy. Perceived threats are demoralizing whether they are real or
not. If top OMSF and NASA management provides the right environment, time
can overcome many of these difficulties.
g. Uniformity in Program Management. NASA has had and will continue
to have a wide variety of programs. It would be a mistake to insist that
the management structure for all programs should be identical since each
program raises its own unique problems of communication, funding, time
scale, contract control, and so on. Furthermore, management techniques
should be no more static than technology, and to find the best mode of
operation may require experimentation, selection, and rejection of whole
schemes or particular details. Consequently, one cannot say that all pro-
grams should be controlled through a lead center with certain prescribed
authority, or that all centers should be involved equally in every under-
taking, or that each program should have a program office at Headquarters.
Each project must be objectively judged for its adaptability to one manage-
ment mode or another.
Nevertheless, there is merit in uniformity. Any new type of opera-
tion inherently includes risk. Within one government agency, individuals
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and suborganizatibns are more comfortable with a large degree of predict-
ability. They learn to respond to an accepted mode of operation and in
so doing they respond with less confusion and greater efficiency. The
proliferation of management roles that are in fact quite different, but
are all referred to as "lead center," will inevitably aggravate the suspi-
cions with which each new management directive is viewed and lengthen the
adjustment time required before productive work can begin.
h. Comments on Advisory Lead Center in Communications. The lead
center function to be performed by the Communications Program Office
located at MSFC avoids actual "management by equals" since this office
will not directly control program funds. It is true that an office at
one center will sit in judgment over the efforts of a sister center or
other offices at the same center, but still its function is essentially
advisory. Final decisions are to be made at Headquarters and all direc-
tives are to flow through the usual channels. Headquarters, in this case
the Communications Office in Applications, may accept or reject or modify
whatever advice it receives. As long as that higher office is always
accessible for appeals and counter arguments, no center or group need fear
that a sister organization rejected its proposal or hobbled its operations,
The "lead center" office must scrupulously avoid favoritism and prejudice,
but there is no reason to believe that cannot be accomplished.
In its role of evaluation and advising, this office has convenient
access to the total technical and managerial resources of MSFC. The
functional directorates, particularly Science and Engineering, already
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contain experts in the wide range of disciplines necessary for deep tech-
nical scrutiny of any program or task, and these individuals need not be
attached to the Communications Office except on an ad hoc basis. Of course,
the Office of Applications lacks an "institutional base". That is to say,
no NASA center is specifically designated as "belonging" to it. By con-
trast, three major centers, MSFC, MSC and KSC, are organizationally within
OMSF. One might, therefore, argue that there is no heed for OMSF to have
a key staff function located outside Headquarters since it can draw directly
on all three centers. But OMSF cannot then adequately evaluate conflicting
claims or proposals without maintaining a staff thought by many to be un-
necessarily large and a duplication of talent existing elsewhere.
The most serious objection to the advisory lead center role is that
the office lacks clout. Without direct control of funds or any line
authority, the advisory group may be continuously frustrated.
It is of interest to note that the group at MSFC which was asked to
propose an organization and method of operation for the Communications
Program Office was reportedly warned to propose a scheme with which they
themselves could live if some other center were given this lead center
role. This reportedly became an overriding consideration in all details
of the proposal, and there is reason to believe that it played a large
part in making their proposed organization acceptable to the Office of
Applications.
2. OMSF Field Centers
Given the character of the Shuttle program and the level at which it
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i.s funded, certain continuities and discontinuities are apparent when
surveying the OMSF field centers.
Houston, almost since its inception, has had a strong program orienta-
tion, and in general, the technical directorates have been subordinate to
program considerations. This was partly due to the varied tasks assigned
to Houston, the new "state-of-the-arts" technology and design problems
associated with the assigned tasks, and a historical succession of quite
strong program managers. Generally, with the exception of developing
mechanisms to manage its lead center responsibility, Houston will not
have any major readjustments to make to accommodate the demands of the
Shuttle program.
Kennedy does have major readjustments to make to accommodate Shuttle.
The trend toward combining manned and unmanned launches will be actual-
ized in this program and the disparate philosophies of these two hereto-
fore separate groups will have to be reconciled. The different vehicle
capabilities and configurations will necessitate reworking launch sites
and test and check-out procedures. Kennedy, although it views its major
responsibility in NASA as a launch service facility, also views its test
and check-out procedures as the ultimate verification of design and devel-
opment. This second function might precipitate conflict if Houston, as
lead center, desires to assume greater test and check-out responsibility.
The planned frequency of Shuttle launches and projected quick turn-
around times will impose a heavy burden on Kennedy and will necessitate
an overhaul of the organizational strategies and operational procedures
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worked out for Apollo and Skylab. Although the launch group already
dominates this center, this will be even more so for Shuttle.
One of the major problems the Shuttle program will face will be
that each field center will need visibility into other parts of the pro-
gram. If a viable configuration and integration mechanism can be estab-
lished, then during the operational phase of Shuttle this proven procedure
can be slightly modified to coordinate the "cargo" configuration and
launch activities specific to each Shuttle flight. While it is true that
Houston as lead center has the overall decision-making responsibility
for design and development of Shuttle, this does not necessarily mean
that all of the program control activity has to be performed at the center
itself.
Houston and Kennedy are alike in that the projected work .load at each
center is comparable to that of Apollo and Skylab. This is not so for
Huntsville, where the work load in Shuttle is significantly reduced when
compared to Apollo. The major readjustments at this center involve accep-
ting a clearly subordinate role in Shuttle development and creating a new
work load to utilize the size of- its work force and physical plant. The
lack of work is a serious dilemma but it can be alleviated by two somewhat
different strategies. First, both Houston and Kennedy should have greater
access to the laboratories at Huntsville and be persuaded to use them as
technical support for the management tasks they have been assigned and,
as well, to tap the vast technical contract monitoring experience that
exists in the labs. Houston, for example, will face a monumental task in
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relating to and monitoring the activities of the prime contractor on
Shuttle, particularly since the prime also has overall technical integra-
tion responsibility. Huntsville can make an invaluable contribution in
this area. Second, rather than encourage Huntsville to develop new pro-
grams, either Shuttle-related or not, the whole problem of maximizing the
use of Shuttle should be made a prime responsibility of this center.
Shuttle was sold to Congress, the President, and the American people as
an all-purpose vehicle which could accomplish numerous ends from survey-
ing earth resources to providing a research base for significant-and
needed scientific developments. As well, it is expected to contribute
to our military capability. But, there is no one single place in all of
NASA where a group is working on all of the potential uses for Shuttle,
working out procedures to encourage its use, or establishing guidelines
and techniques to marry varied user requirements with NASA procedures and
the constraints of the Shuttle vehicle itself. This is a large task and
one that Huntsville could quite adequately handle.
With appropriate Headquarters action one can foresee, in the future
operational phase of Shuttle, a relatively clean and co-equal breakout of
responsibilities among the three centers. Kennedy would be the launch
service facility, Houston would control the missions and Huntsville would
manage the payloads and experiments and develop routine and innovative
patterns of use for Shuttle.
3. The Role of the Center Director
Center Directors in OMSF are called on to play a variety of roles
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internal to a center and relating the center to the larger OMSF organiza-
tion and other units of the Agency. In the current period with reduced
resources and the greater inter-center activity and/or program mix, the
role of the center director has become even more complex.
The program organization format utilized in OMSF demanded that the
center director trade off program, functional, and institutional considera-
tions in the course of carrying out his role. With the lead center concept,
greater complexities are introduced, particularly in defining the hierarchi-
cal relationships between center directors and program managers, at the
center and headquarters levels. Before Shuttle, although there were in-
herent ambiguities, the center director's position vis-a-vis program
managers at the center, the Headquarters program manager, and the head of
OMSF, was understood. Depending upon the situation, at times the center
director played an institutional role, sitting on the Management Council,
for example, and evaluating the progress of Apollo program activity. At
other times he played a program role, relating to the Apollo Program Manager
at Headquarters and "supporting" the program manager at his center. While
ambiguities were present, the existence of a clearly defined Headquarters
program office, attached to the Associate Administrator's Office of Manned
Space Flight, with clear overall program authority, provided a necessary
starting point for working out authority relations in the organization.
On Shuttle, the lead center concept has blurred the Headquarters-
center distinction and has created an ambiguity overload in terms of
authority and responsibility in the overall program organization. It
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appears that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between technical
responsibility and policy responsibility for running Shuttle. Further, it
is necessary to locate the responsibility for over-all policy at Head-
quarters. Without this distinction, each center director will have diffi-
culty in carrying out his center's program responsibility. At Houston, the
center director might be inclined to take on broad responsibilities similar
to those of the head of OMSF in Apollo. This would be much too great a
responsibility when coupled with his center roles. At the other two cen-
ters, the autonomy and hierarchical balance which the center director pro-
vides would be upset. If the distinction between technical authority and
overall program responsibility is not clarified the center directors of
Kennedy and Huntsville would be primarily taking direction from Houston
and become subordinate to that center rather than acting as co-equals
whereby all three centers relate in essentially the same way to a clearly
superordinate office at Headquarters.
Regardless of how one assesses the center director's role, it is
obvious that a center director to be successful in OMSF must have certain
qualities. He must, first of all, be technically competent. Each of the
centers is involved in work of great technical complexity and to oversee
this work the center director himself must have a strong technical back-
ground. Second, a center director must be an organizationally aware and
sensitive person who can divide the labor in such a way as to optimize
productivity and keep all elements of the center satisfied. Also, he must
anticipate environmental changes and alter his center organization to
' • ' • • ' • ' : - 3 5 -
anticipate or accommodate them. Third, the center director must be strong
enough to keep all of the diverse elements integrated, to protect the
autonomy of his center (particularly in the light of the numerous new
inter-program office and inter-center relationships emerging in NASA), and
to protect the base of technical expertise in his center. Fourth, it helps
if the center director is an "insider" who knows the center, is trusted by
center personnel, and has the respect of those within and outside his cen-
ter.
The decreasing distinction between manned and unmanned flight and the
resultant greater interpenetration of other programs into OMSF centers will
be a major problem for the center director. To be responsive to all of the
varying demands and yet maintain center autonomy and integrity will be a
great challenge for the center director. \
B. PROGRAMS
1. Program Organization
Programs are defined by schedule, performance and cost parameters.
On the Apollo program, schedule and performance considerations predominated.
Shuttle, by contrast, is being managed with cost as the major factor. Per-
formance, in terms of more narrowly designed objectives and schedules, has
been continually modified to meet the unyielding cost constraint. The
manner in which Manned Space Flight in NASA operates, particularly the
field centers, is changing considerably because of the differences between
Apollo and Shuttle. This section will suggest some of the organizational
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alternatives open to OMSF in the light of present and predictable near-
term future circumstances with which this office will have to cope.
Essentially OMSF can move toward one of two opposite extremes. First,
it can continue to grow and maintain its strong program orientation as was
the case with Apollo. It was hoped that Shuttle would provide the means
for large and sustained program activity, but changing national priorities
and emergent socio-political factors dictated otherwise. If NASA is to
retain its strong programmatic emphasis, either the Shuttle program will
have to be enlarged in concept and resource allocations, or some large-
scale complementary program will have to be started. Neither alternative
seems likely.
The second extreme OMSF can move toward is a revised but larger ver-
sion of the old NACA organization. That is, OMSF can become a bureau-type
office concentrating on its national space resource responsibility. This
development pattern would be quite traumatic for the overall Agency in
that it would require further reductions in manpower and a wholesale re-
organization with laboratory and technical considerations dominant.
It is probable that the form of OMSF's future organization will be
somewhere between these two extremes. The near-term future of the Agency,
particularly after Shuttle, appears to entail a period of relative quies-
cence and therefore organizational changes toward the bureau-type agency.
When the present responsibilities in OMSF are matched against its capabili-
ties, OMSF is in an untenable position. The cost of maintaining the
present organization and associated physical plant cannot be justified
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given the tasks OMSF has been assigned and its future prospects. NASA,
and in particular OMSF, has already demonstrated that it can grow in size
and capability very quickly if the occasion arises. It would appear that
a practical strategy for OMSF would involve adopting a modified bureau-
type posture and attempting to conserve as much of its technical capability
as possible.
In view of known and probable tasks that will be the responsibility
of OMSF, the three field centers are experiencing quite disparate problems.
Houston, with the lead center designation for Shuttle, is not facing any
major readjustment. It will continue to be organized around a major, large-
scale program effort. What adjustment problems the center will face in-
volve issues of establishing its lead center presence in OMSF, gaining
greater visibility into other centers of OMSF and establishing and main-
taining all of the coordinative groups and activities necessary to perform
its major technical management responsibility. If the decision is made to
stress in-house technical and management support activities, the task of
managing the development of a significant portion of the Shuttle program
coupled with the overall lead center responsibility for Shuttle will mean
that MSC will not have to undergo any major reorganization.
In many respects, the situation at Kennedy is similar to that of
Houston. The Shuttle program places a significant burden on this center
in terms of developing new launch facilities and capabilities. The pro-
jected increased frequency of launches and the required short turnaround
times involve KSC in both large-scale developmental and operational
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activities. While Shuttle is certainly different from Apollo, from the
perspective of quantity of work, Kennedy will be kept as active if not
more so with Shuttle. At this center the major readjustment will involve
integrating unmanned and manned launch-related activities. The planned
launch site on the West Coast will impact activities at Kennedy only mini-
mally.
Huntsville, of the three centers, has been the most greatly affected
by the phaseout of Apollo and the emergence of Shuttle as the major follow-
on manned space flight activity. It continues to have a great technical
capacity distinct from the other QMSF field centers. Given the lack of
significant Shuttle responsibility, the high degree of uncertainly surround-
ing programs after Shuttle, and its superb technical capability, it is our
suggestion that Huntsville should adopt a technical service orientation,
and temporarily, at least, de-emphasize its large program management
function. This could be done by using the Huntsville labs as the major
technical support for development activities being managed at Kennedy and
Houston. As well, a conscious decision should be made to funnel research
activities and frontier state-of-the-arts technology development work to
this center. And finally, a more significant role in Shuttle should be
defined for Huntsville involving payloads and experiments for Shuttle,
coupled with developing methods to enhance the "user" demand for Shuttle.
This new direction for Huntsville will entail a major readjustment
whereby the center no longer will be organized around major program activ-
ity, but rather, technical capability. Further, if the "user" facilitation
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role is delegated to Huntsville, the Program Development directorate can
be transformed into a User Development directorate and a better focus for
the activities and planning in that section of the Huntsville organization
can be established. All of this will require better integration and respon-
siveness on the part of the center, and therefore stronger center manage-
ment.
2. Project Management
In our judgment, NASA's project management system is sound. But it
is essential that the project management system capitalize on the strengths
of the functional and institutional organizational elements of NASA while
overcoming some of the barriers of the large, functionally-oriented organi-
zation. Specifically, NASA could further improve its project management
mode by continuing to emphasize these areas:
a. OMSF should continually emphasize the importance of the project
management system to the success of NASA's developing projects. This can
be accomplished, in part, by disseminating the project manager's authori-
ties, responsibilities, and charter to all the "working levels" of the
organization — not only within a center but also among interfacing field
centers. Such a step can minimize to some extent the conflict situations
and ambiguities which almost always develop when a new program is being
established. As smaller, less visible projects are undertaken by NASA,
this will become even more important. This is clearly a NASA top manage-
ment responsibility.
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b. NASA must continue the development of inter-center matrix manage-
ment techniques. If NASA is viewed as a national R & D resource for astro-
nautics and aeronautics, more management attention must be devoted to
identifying and integrating the vast managerial and technical expertise
within the total NASA organization. Emphasis by NASA's top management on
the necessity of more effective inter-center integration can have the im-
portant advantage of more fully utilizing NASA's in-house competence. One
of the most positive benefits would be in eliminating redundant manpower
resources.
c. One of the principal factors which makes NASA's approach to project
management truly unique is the strong in-house technical capability. This
technical back-up must be preserved.
d. In the future NASA should give more attention to "cross-skill"
training for project managers and selected technical personnel. In the
past we have observed that long-term project management assignments often
do affect an individual's technical capabilities. In some cases, project
managers have openly admitted to us that they have indeed lost their tech-
nical competence. This causes employee mobility problems when project
assignments are completed. Too often the result is to overburden the
managerial ranks with people who have no real role to fulfill.
e. Our field interviews indicate that in the future a concentrated
effort should be made (and encouraged by OMSF) to keep the various program
offices as lean as feasible. Many managers in the field centers have ex-
pressed the notion that in Apollo the program offices were allowed to
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become too large, thus affecting efficiency and response capability. For
future programs we recommend that the various program offices rely more
heavily on existing functional and staff offices. Such an approach, when
feasible, leaves the expert in his normal functional organization. The
Shuttle Program Office at MSC, for example, has made some important strides
in this direction in the areas of flight computer programming, range safety
and flight operations.
3. Subsystem Management
A positive step has been taken to improve the effectiveness of the
subsystem manager concept. At MSFC, in the Apollo program, the subsystem
manager was located in the Project Management Directorate (PM). A key
role of the subsystem manager was to interface with various laboratories
in S & E to elicit subsystem support. While this approach proved workable,
there was the inevitable conflict over subsystem objectives. That is,
various forms of conflict occurred between the project management organi-
zation and the various functional technical directorates. The subsystem
manager is now co-located in the functional directorate. This new sub-
system management mode is essentially the approach employed at MSC in the
Apollo program.
For future projects it appears that a positive step is being made by
increasing the subsystem manager's authority for his identifiable work
package. Under this approach the subsystem manager will be given a more
responsible job and will have visibility as the single point-of-commitment
for a work package. This should help the subsystem managers to interface
more successfully and give them better access to technical skill centers
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in the laboratories and technical areas. Rather than being attached
solely to a project manager, the new subsystem manager will be part of
the laboratory organization. For this approach to function effectively,
the subsystem manager will have to be carefully selected and his appoint-
ment agreeable to the major interfaces.
The subsystem manager will be an "integrator" of both technical and
managerial information as it affects his entire work package. For this
approach to work there must be a clear definition of the subsystem
manager's role with all the key interfaces. It must be understood that
the new subsystem manager is the single point-of-commitment. As noted
in our field interviews, several key questions must be asked in delinr
eating the subsystem manager's role:
Is there agreement within the various work units of the
center as to what the subsystem manager's job actually
entails?
Is it clear to everyone whom he is ultimately responsible
to?
-- Who reviews the work of the subsystem manager?
How will conflicts be resolved? What appeal channels
are available?
-- Who defines the subsystem manager's work package? How
are agreements met among key interfaces on the assigned
work package?
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-- How will subsystem integration be accomplished?
-- How are key interfaces established?
In summary, we feel this new approach to the role of the subsystem
manager will be an important step in increasing the effectiveness of
NASA's project management system.
IV. PLANNING ACTIVITIES
A. LONG-RANGE PLANNING .
An area of concern to NASA is the viability of the Agency's long-range
planning efforts. While this study group is concerned with the total NASA
planning process, our remarks are particularly addressed to the planning
function within OMSF. NASA and OMSF have had a number of long-range plan-
ning operations but their effective utilization appears to have been spo-
radic. Some of the traumas experienced by NASA in the Apollo phase-down
and the reorientation of NASA to a multi-project mode might have been
avoided if NASA's planning efforts had been 1) more substantial, and 2)
given greater organizational support and commitment at all levels.
. • . • • > •
1. Problem Areas
The following areas are problematic for the Agency and should be
addressed in NASA's long-range planning efforts:
a. Perspective on Shuttle. Some personnel at the field centers ques-
tion-how and where NASA is focusing its future efforts. Many field center
personnel do not see the evidence of a NASA long-range plan. In particular,
there is some doubt about the eventual role of the Space Shuttle as it
affects their own field center activities. Many functional areas, for ex-
ample, within the OMSF Field Center do not appear to understand how they
will integrate with Shuttle or what Shuttle will mean to the long-term ob-
jectives of NASA. Further, Shuttle is often perceived as being synonomous
with NASA's long-range planning activities. We believe this is detrimental
to NASA and that Shuttle must be put in a more appropriate perspective.
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b. Visibility of NASA Plans at Center Level. Due to the lack of a
visible planning system which NASA personnel can readily identify with,
NASA often does not operate as an integrated, goal-oriented organization.
While there is ample evidence that field centers are responsive to current
NASA plans and programs where their role is clearly identified, there is
some ambiguity at the field center level regarding the role NASA Headquar-
ters wants a field center to perform when NASA plans do not significantly
impact the center. This causes confusion and ambiguity on the part of
field center management and personnel have developed a "field center"
orientation rather than a "NASA-wide" orientation.
c. Integration of Manned and Unmanned Program Plans. The distinc-
tions between manned and unmanned activities are gradually eroding. NASA
thus needs to derive a long-range planning system which can be a catalytic
agent in the integration of manned and unmanned activities at all field
centers. As one NASA manager remarked, "we need a long-range plan on
which we can base our operational plans."
d. Anticipation of National Priorities. It seems clear that an in-
creasingly important activity for NASA during the latter part of this
decade and beyond will involve closer working arrangements with other
organizations outside the NASA/aerospace context. A planning system should
be devised that can anticipate shifting national priorities and thereby
assist NASA in its integrative efforts with state and federal agencies.
e. Marketing NASA's Capabilities. NASA by its charter has a mandate
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to "market" its scientific and engineering capabilities. To date, how-
ever, their general utilization in the public and private sectors has been
minor. By the establishment of an effective planning system NASA can:
1) assist in identifying and assessing the potential markets for its tech-
nology; 2) facilitate the building of a demand for its technology; and
3) monitor the success of the technology utilization process. As a national
R & D resource NASA must identify the technologies which can benefit various
sectors of society. Only by an intensive planning system can these tech-
nologies be effectively identified, assessed, and eventually transferred
to potential users. ' .
2. Dimensions of a Total Planning System
NASA's planning system should incorporate two fundamental dimensions:
a. Operational Planning System. NASA has been almost exclusively
concerned with an operational planning system. This planning system is
primarily based on current and projected programs and associated activities,
budgeting, and the forecast of human and physical resource requirements.
b. Strategic Planning, the second planning dimension that is essen-
tial for NASA is strategic planning, which is concerned with long-range
forecasting, scenario development, and the possible impact of environmental
influences on NASA. Effective strategic planning can reduce the uncertain-
ties of the future by forecasting conditions which are likely to change or
alter the nature and mission of NASA. Strategic planning is an important
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tool in identifying opportunities and threats early enough so that action
plans can be initiated and implemented.
There are two important components of a strategic planning system:
Technology Forecasting: The role of the technology forecasting
activities would be to identify and assess emerging technological
developments which could impact NASA so that these can be factored
into NASA's long-range planning efforts. Technology forecasting
also would include the forecasting of NASA-generated technology.
Socio-political Forecasting: This involves developing alterna-
tive scenarios of events which could occur in the social/political
environment and which could affect NASA's future whether they are
threats or opportunities. Some examples are:
Attitudinal changes of various sectors of society toward
national and international space-related activities.
-- Changes in the political climate affecting funding of
NASA activities.
Changes in attitudes tpward means to solve chronic
national public sector and world problems; i.e., the
desire to use technological and/or ideological solutions
to such problems as nutrition, war, international con-
flict resolution, earth resources utilization, etc.
-- Changes in national life styles, values, importance of
national and international social and political problems.
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It is important to emphasize that neither technology forecasting nor
social forecasting alone is sufficient for anticipating NASA's emerging
environments. It will take both approaches to develop alternative future
roles for NASA. NASA cannot effectively operate in its', larger "host"
environment unless clear, meaningful goals are articulated and approved by
society. (The SST is a good case in point.)
The probabilities are fairly low for the emergence of a clear-cut
Presidential or Congressional action-oriented mandate for NASA to follow.
As a consequence, NASA must largely take the initiative for developing
innovative programs and marketing them to the public, Congress, and the
Executive Branch. Thus, in the future, it will be important for NASA to
build a broad-based constituency and strengthen its links with those
who make and influence decisions which can impact NASA's future. Such
activities would be an integral component of NASA's strategic planning
activities.
Both operational planning and strategic planning must be integrated
since they are interactive components of a total planning system. Strate-
gic planning will become critical for NASA's future. Our recommendations
for the establishment of a strategic planning system within NASA does not
imply that NASA has not followed such a course in the past. NASA by the
nature of its programs has had to do strategic planning, technology fore-
casting, and some socio-political forecasting. Our report, however,
advocates a continuous, concentrated NASA planning effort.
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B. STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
Strategic organizational analysis is closely related to:long-range
planning and must be integrated with it to be effective. While we realize
that some form of organizational analysis is being done, we are advocating
an increased emphasis on this important dimension of organizational plan-
ning.
1. Organizational Audit
We advocate that a rigorous and continuing organizational audit should
be made for the entire NASA organization commencing with OMSF. Strategic
organizational analysis involves the evaluation of every identifiable organi-
zational unit and assesses each unit's current and probable future contribu-
tion to NASA's missions and objectives. To make NASA a lean and flexible
organization, there are a number of organizational areas which should be
identified which may not serve any current or strategic NASA purpose. In
effect, we advocate that the functional and staff areas within each of the
field centers and at Headquarters be viewed in terms of contribution. Only
by following some form of strategic organizational analysis can NASA meet
the flexibility requirements that a multi-project organization demands.
Flexibility will be critical for NASA in view of the more uncertain nature
of its future programs. In short, an effective response capability will
become increasingly important for NASA. If various organizational units
are audited for their present and potential contribution to NASA's long-
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range comprehensive plan, each work unit can then be classified as
"strategic," "core operating base," "marginal," or "expendable". .
2. Classifications
a. Strategic. A strategic classification denotes that the contri-
bution of a particular organization unit is critical to NASA's long-term
future. It is an area which should receive priority in terms of top
management attention, resources, and manpower.
b. Core Operating Base. A classification of core operating base
would denote a necessary, enduring part of the organization, such as
necessary institutional areas and functional skill centers. For example,
an R & D laboratory or work-unit within the laboratory might have multiple
contributions to make to NASA's objectives, whereas an engineering unit
whose capabilities can be easily duplicated may not be necessary. Core
operating areas would be those areas which are necessary to support the
various strategic functions and programs of NASA. Unless the audit care-
fully examines the entire NASA organization, it is highly likely that vari-
ous units will be thought of as core operating areas but, in reality, de-
serve a lower classification rating. Classifying those institutional/
functional areas at Headquarters and at the field centers which are clearly
not strategic or core operating base will be one of the most difficult
activities in the auditing process.
c. Marginal. A marginal classification might reflect that a particu-
lar work unit should be supported if the Agency can afford it.
: ' ' ' - s i - . . . . . . - . . ;
d. Expendable. The expendable category denotes that an area is not
necessary for current or forecasted NASA objectives. The area, for ex-
ample, might have outlived its original charter. Over time, however, the
particular unit was not dismantled and has existed due to "benign neglect,"
oversight, or unjustified entrenchment.
A careful audit is bound to reveal that certain areas of a particular
unit are indeed important, while others have limited or no contribution to
make if a strategic plan exists. We are aware of the many constraints on
NASA, such as the Civil Service System. We feel, however, that NASA is
now in a good position to begin working towards a concrete plan. It will
become more difficult to do so as time passes and the organization becomes
increasingly bureaucratic.
This type of organizational analysis should be a continuing function
with high-level NASA management support. The recent decision to restructure
Program Management at MSFC is a fairly valid example of the results which a
continuing strategic organizational analysis audit could make with top
management support.
3. Manpower Advisory Council
An important value of strategic organizational analysis will be its
contribution to RIF planning and implementation. While some procedures
already exist for RIF planning, we feel that a concentrated effort also
must be made whereby priorities are established on the basis of total orga-
nizational needs. It is suggested that priorities be established with the
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management of the specific work unit and a NASA-wide Manpower Advisory
Council. It would be necessary for such an Advisory Council to be closely
integrated with NASA's long-range planning function and the recommended
strategic organizational analysis function. Within many work units it is
obvious that some skills are more expendable than others. Where possible,
those skills which do not enhance NASA's technical response capability
should be subject to the earliest RIFs.
C. FIELD CENTER FUTURE PROGRAM PLANNING
In terms of long-range or advanced program planning, one area which
has concerned us is the activities of the Program Development Organization
at MSFC and the Future Program Office at MSC. Both groups are actively in-
•<* .• . .
volved in attempts to evaluate new program alternatives for their respective
field centers and for NASA. The important question, however, is the degree
to which these activities are congruent with NASA's over-all, long-range
plans and objectives. If they are congruent, the activities are logical.
We generally agree with such a method of new program development at the
field centers, where in-depth technical capability exists. On the other
hand, if program development activities at MSC and MSFC are not integrated
and coordinated by a long-range master plan, we feel that such efforts may
well be inefficient because the efforts of each center will not be coordin-
ated with what NASA should and could be doing.
Our interviews have indicated that there is some confusion over the
roles of future program development groups at the field centers as they
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relate to over-all NASA planning. We believe that it is important for
Headquarters to decide whether field center program development activi-
ties should be coordinated with NASA's long-range plans, whether they
should be decentralized operations to help the field centers market their
capabilities to the rest of the NASA operation, or whether program develop-
ment activities should be some combination of these roles. Whatever the
decision, it is important to disseminate to the field center personnel
Headquarters' view of these activities.
D. NASA ASSET UTILIZATION
NASA has accrued a number of physical assets which cannot be easily
replaced if allowed to deteriorate.. A problem currently facing NASA is
how to determine whether an asset should be retained or discarded, and
how to minimize the maintenance expense of those assets which are poten-
tially useful to NASA. While some of these resources contribute directly
to NASA's national R & D capability, others may be expendable and should
be disposed of in some way. The problem of asset evaluation is related
directly to the development of a viable long-range plan. We feel that
one of the most important steps NASA can take in the transition from a
dominant, large program to the concurrent management of several smaller
programs is to employ those assets which are useful and eliminate or
dispose of those not useful to NASA's future. At MSFC, for example, the
total "value" of assets (MSFC and contractors) reportedly is approximately
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two billion dollars. While some of these assets have essentially a zero
disposal value, it has been estimated that their replacement cost would
be almost double their original cost. The effect of an inventory of NASA's
assets will probably be greatest at MSFC since it has more industrial
assets than the other OMSF field centers. In particular, an audit should
be made of the following:
Michou
-- Mississipi Test Facility
-- NASA Special Tooling/Soft-ware/Computers
Space Experiments which have not been used
Plant and manufacturing equipment at the
contractor's plant and at NASA field centers
A realistic evaluation of NASA's assets can only be made in the light
of a long-range plan. A simplified scheme of the NASA asset inventory and
evaluation process is shown in Figure 1.
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NASA Long-Range
Plan
| NASA Asset Identiflcationf»
Asset Evaluation
Figure 1. NASA Asset Inventory Process
V. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES
In this section of the report five factors are discussed which deal
'.
directly with operational activities of programs and centers within OMSF.
Changes which have taken place are viewed through a comparison with opera-
tional activities noted in the recent past, and some attempt is made to
assess the effects of these changes on OMSF programs and resources, i This
is not intended to be an exhaustive review of transitional factors, but is
i
simply comment on various details which seem to this research team worth
evaluating as program plans and organizational structure are reviewed by
OMSF.
A. CONVERGENCE OF MSC AND MSFC ACTIVITIES
In the past few years the technical expertise and the specific activ-
ities of the two major OMSF development centers, MSC and MSFC, have con-
verged significantly and tend to overlap. This had not been so to the same
extent through the earlier phases of the Apollo program where the tasks of
the two centers could be quite clearly distinguished and each center was
very fully occupied with its own contribution to that large program. MSFC,
building upon a core of personnel already experienced in booster technology,
developed a large, highly competent R & D organization concerning itself
primarily with the design, production and testing of various kinds of space-
craft boosters. While many contractor organizations also have developed
skill in booster engineering, their efforts tend to rise and fall with the
magnitude of each contract they are awarded. It is fair to say that MSFC,.
- 5 6 - I , , - '
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because of its stability and continuity through many projects, became and
still is the most important repository of booster knowledge and experience
in the country.
MSC developed more rapidly. Although it originally lacked- a nucleus
with extensive astronautic experience, MSC's mission caused it to evolve
into the national focal point of expertise in spacecraft design, flight
crew training, and operations, particularly mission control.
KSC, of course, concentrated on the checkout and launching of manned
and unmanned spacecraft. In cooperation with the other two centers, it
developed meticulous checkout procedures which contributed in a major way
to the success of KSC launches.
As the end of the Apollo program approached, and with the future of
NASA only vaguely defined, the development centers at Huntsville and
Houston started to broaden the scope of their expertise to enable them to
compete more effectively for post-Apollo programs. MSFC, already somewhat
involved in the training of astronauts by virtue of its neutral buoyancy
tank, involved itself to a greater extent in the planning and preliminary
design of projects like HEAD and Skylab. The development tasks involved
spacecraft, crew operations, and mission operations. The boosters for
these projects were essentially fully developed items.
At the same time, MSC extended its work into the booster area, par-
ticularly for the Space Shuttle program. The booster and spacecraft are
much more closely integrated with each other than they were with Apollo,
! . . .
and so the preliminary design of Shuttle necessarily required in-depth
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knowledge of booster engines as well as spacecraft and crew operations.
Taken by itself, the broadening or rounding out of a center's exper-
tise seems to be a desirable objective. However, OMSF is operating with
much more limited resources than it did a few years ago. It cannot afford
to have two centers which duplicate each other, nor would the Congress or
Administration permit such a situation to exist for long. It is their
unique, in-depth expertise that has brought distinction to these develop-
ment centers. The expanded scope of activities at either center can now
come only at the expense of diluting some of the areas of established ex-
cellence with regard to both in-house technical talent and the finely
honed ability to monitor contractors in highly specialized fields.
KSC has avoided direct competition with MSC and MSFC for projects be-
cause its mission has been distinct and its responsibilities have kept it
fully occupied. The advantages to NASA and the nation that have accrued
by virtue of KSC's relative independence are generally recognized in OMSF.
This independence has guaranteed a level of checkout control and design
verification through test that might otherwise not be possiblei There-
fore, the possibilities of reassigning some of the checkout authority to
MSC or MSFC should be evaluated very carefully. Because of the larger
degree of interdependence between the subsystems of Shuttle, there may
well be a tendency for MSC as lead center, or for the Shuttle integration
contractor, to insist on control of the flight hardware much beyond that
exerted in the Apollo missions. This would constitute not only a further
dilution of a development center, but a weakening of the key strength of
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KSC in its own quality control function.
The advantage of maintaining separate and distinct field centers goes
beyond the value of unduplicated technical expertise. It allows each cen-
ter to develop its own management scheme suitable to the peculiarities of
the center's mission. Innovative developments in management should be
transmitted from one center to another exactly as new technology must be
to avoid parallel, overlapping experiments.
B. CONTRAST BETWEEN APOLLO AND MULTI-PROGRAM OPERATION
Many of the current difficulties in managerial and operational activi-
ties in NASA as a whole and in OMSF in particular stem from the transition
from a concentrated preoccupation with the huge Apollo program to a more
balanced concern for a number of ongoing programs and long-range planning
for the future. It is very instructive to compare operational activities
and organization during Apollo with those of the present and foreseeable
future.
1. Defined Goals
The clearly stated primary goal of Apollo, to land a man on the moon
before 1970, made planning and priority assignment unambiguous. To have
a definite objective and a definite time limit is a program controller's
dream. Neither of these has been specifically enunciated for Shuttle or
any other post-Apollo program. Shifting priorities coupled with open-ended
goals and variable funding will aggravate all future programs.
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2. Real-Time vs. Phased Design and Development
In the Apollo program, although the objective was clearly defined, the
time constraint was responsible for many costly changes as the whole Agency
learned from ongoing experience. For Shuttle and other programs, there can
be a more deliberate phased development with careful evaluation of alter-
natives, optimizing R & D versus operational costs. While some design
flexibility must always exist in a complicated program, design requirements
can be frozen early and costly changes minimized.
3. Resource Utilization
In Appllo, all centers were fully utilized, and although some duplica-
tion of effort and wasteful activities were unavoidable, manpower and facili-
ties were not idle. Not all components of the OMSF centers are now fully
utilized and they have become very competitive for work assignments and
authority. This demands a strong control by Headquarters at a time when
Headquarters staff must be reduced. The entire Agency is suffering con-
traction pains. It is always easier to cope with growth, and organizational
shrinkage is always traumatic. The inevitable lag in adjustment to reduced
funding complicates the underlying problem of transferring operations from
Apollo to current programs.
4. Program Offices
When there was a step-function rise in the number and magnitude of
contracts managed by MSFC early in Apollo, there was a need for the
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coordination and program visibility afforded by the Industrial Opera-
tions (later Program Management) Directorate. With reduced resources,
that center could not afford this additional management structure. But
what is more important, without a management directorate, all programs,
large and small, now have direct line access to the center director. At
both MSFC and MSG, the center director should be the key administrator in
ensuring access of programs to functional resources. He is in the best
position to effect the necessary trade-offs and to assure program offices
at Headquarters that priorities are being adequately considered.
5. The Mixture of Manned and Unmanned Missions
The three OMSF centers were overwhelmingly concerned with manned
flight programs during the Apollo period. Now each center has significant
unmanned space activities and there is more interaction with other NASA
offices. One effect of this will be a reduction in the influence the astro-
nauts as individuals and as a group have had on many design considerations.
Mission Operations, for instance, must still consider their needs but must
take a more balanced view of mission objectives. As MSFC, MSC, and KSC
react more and more with other parts of NASA and manned and unmanned ex-
periments are further mixed, perhaps for their long-range viability these
centers should no longer be designated as OMSF centers.
6. Distinction Between Center Roles
In Apollo, MSFC was primarily booster oriented and MSC primarily con-
cerned with the manned spacecraft. As noted elsewhere, there has since
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been a blurring in this distinction between the activities of the two cen-
ters. It is useful to think of one as outstanding in large hardware
development and another as extremely competent in mission control, to
name only two separate areas. A lack of distinct role identification
weakens both centers.
7. Design Reliability
It has been noted elsewhere in this report that in post-Apollo pro-
grams the shift in priorities from performance/schedule/cost towards per-
formance/cost/schedule and even to cost/performance/schedule has begun to
take place. This demands a complete reevaluation of design philosophy as
each program is initiated. Not only dp post-Apollo programs have a more
relaxed schedule restraint, but also designers can achieve economy and
weight reduction through broader uncertainty limits and decreased redun-
dancy. This is obviously true in unmanned missions, but is also possible
in man-rated hardware where experience has developed confidence in various
systems. Policy in this regard can be changed more easily than individual
activities.
8. Complexity of Interfaces
Complicated as Apollo was, the interfaces between the Saturn booster
and the spacecraft were minimal. By comparison, the engine and spacecraft
interfaces in the Space Shuttle program are much more numerous and complex.
This demands increased communication between centers at the lower levels of
project management.
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C. NASA AS A CONTRACTOR
There are two reasons why various parts of NASA will find themselves
acting increasingly as a contractor rather than as the manager of contracts
First, other government agencies and private industry are finding NASA's
capabilities of use to them and will seek to use both its facilities and
its expertise in an expanding range of technical problems. Second, with
the adoption of the lead center management mode, OMSF has created a more
formal manager/contractor relationship between the lead center and any
other part of the Agency assigned a task in the lead center's program.
This will be an extension of the program office/functional directorate
relationships familiar in past programs, but with a significant differ-
ence.
1. External Contractor
NASA in general and OMSF in particular have acquired vast experience
in managing major federal contracts. The Agency has been rightfully
praised for its ability to work with private corporations on a tremendous
range of development contracts, and this represents a unique area of ex-
pertise within NASA.
The Agency has already performed essentially as a contractor in such
areas as the launching of various earth satellites for others including
the Department of Defense, foreign governments, and the communications
industry. Also, basic development work and testing have been done for
- 64 -
the aircraft industry. But much of this has been secondary to NASA's
principle concern and has not involved OMSF to any significant extent.
Now it will be very advantageous for the Agency not only to agree
to perform certain tasks for others, but aggressively to seek out con-
tracts from others. This can mean both a much expanded source of funding
and an opportunity to display its value to the nation as a technological
resource and as an imaginative and creative problem solver. NASA recog-
nizes these opportunities but might not appreciate the inversion of its
contractual relationship.
The immediate opportunities for NASA are in the area of earth re-
sources. The Agency's services are being sought by the federal Depart-
ments of Interior, Agriculture, Transportation, and Housing and Urban
Development; and will be sought further by Coast and Geodetic Survey, the
Army Corps of Engineers, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. Certainly private corporations in communications will
expand demands for satellite launch, possibly to include maintenance and
repair, and many manufacturing companies could benefit from NASA's R & D.
Strong Headquarters leadership is essential in establishing this new
role, A real transformation of attitudes is required for managers, scien-
tists, and engineers throughout NASA if these expanding possibilities are
to be exploited. All must realize that the life of the Agency depends on
performance in these areas, and they must do more than simply respond to
requests; they must create demands for their services. No one outside of
. - 65 -
NASA can appreciate the potential of the technology and management capabil-
ity in the Agency. Very few can imagine where NASA might be of service.
It is not enough to say, "we are willing and able." NASA must invest time
and energy in identifying which of its capabilities might benefit others
and what problems in both the private and public domains might be amenable
to solution through NASA expertise. Furthermore, NASA personnel must real-
ize that these are respectable pursuits and that accomplishments in non-
space applications of technology will be appreciated and rewarded.
2. Internal Contractor
The lead center management mode creates a different kind of contractor
relationship. In the Apollo program, each OMSF center responded to the
directives of the Headquarters program office, and line authority was un-
ambiguous. Horizontal relationships between program management and func-
tional directorates operated principally within one center or another.
With MSC now lead center in the Space Shuttle program, another center such
as MSFC when working on that program is operating essentially as a con-
tractor to MSC's Shuttle Program Office. Each center working on some part
of Shuttle will have a Shuttle Program Office through which entree to its
functional directorates is controlled or monitored. Whether that office
actually has authority through control of funds or is simply a liaison
office, whether it acts as manager or resident clearing house will depend
on the control Headquarters exerts on its lead center and on the personal
style of each manager. New stresses will undoubtedly be generated. This
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contractor relationship with another center may in fact be a great advan-
tage in the control of the program, but it introduces new institutional
relationships within OMSF and requires some revision in the attitudes of
both management and technical personnel. The whole question of lead
center role is dealt with in Section III of this report.
D. OMSF MANPOWER UTILIZATION
We believe that the field centers have become less flexible and
responsive to organizational and programmatic needs for two reasons. The
first is the proliferation of middle-management positions. The second is
the protection by some managers of the number of manpower spaces allocated
to their work units. Therefore, we strongly recommend that a manpower
advisory council composed of top field center personnel be established to
facilitate the shifting of manpower resources when and where needed. This
is, of course, congruent with our recommendation for strategic organiza-
tional analysis. We are aware of the Civil Service problems entailed in
such a recommendation, but we are hopeful that NASA and the Civil Service
Commission can cooperate to make the system more flexible and responsive.
1. Management Positions '
The proliferation of management positions often results when an indi-
vidual in a technical job can be rewarded further only if he is given a
supervisory position. As a consequence, he may be given a grade for
supervision by having sometimes as few as three people reporting to him.
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The establishment of these small departments and "shops" often leads to
an increasing fragmentation and rigidity within a field center. To have
a small work unit the "supervisor" needs his own secretary, his own mail
symbol, his own cost code, etc. All this makes the shift of human re-
sources more difficult, impeding organizational flexibility and adapt-
ability. The administrative expense of maintaining these fragmented work
units often cannot be justified. Unfortunately, there is the natural
tendency to protect and maintain the work unit even after it has outlived
its usefulness.
2. Manpower Spaces .
The second impediment to organizational flexibility is the high value
placed on "manpower spaces." The individual work unit's"wealth" at any
level in the organization is too often measured by the number of manpower
spaces allocated to it, regardless of expertise, need, or priority. As
one NASA manager remarked, "Manpower spaces are like a peasant owning
chickens: if you own more than the next guy you are better off." Efforts
to promote flexibility, rotation of personnel, and integration of work
units are sometimes defeated because supervisors are reluctant to relin-
quish these spaces. Often the spaces themselves appear to be more impor-
tant than the individuals occupying them. This problem is most serious
when a man who is not being fully utilized or who is unhappy with his role
within his assigned work unit cannot get a release, even when another unit
or office desperately needs his services.
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E. CONTRACT INTEGRATION FOR SHUTTLE
•f
One aspect of the recent contract awards in the Space Shuttle pro-
gram has bothered this research team and that is that the prime contractor
for the program has been awarded also the contract for technical integra-
tion of all efforts. We hasten to note that no one interviewed by us has
expressed the same misgivings even in response to direct questions about
the matter. Still, the potential for inherent conflict of interest must
be noted.
The arguments are strong in favor of having the large prime contractor
responsible for tracking progress of its own efforts and those of its sub-
contractors. In the Space Shuttle program this will be a tremendous task.
The manpower required for this alone will be beyond the civil service man-
power either desired by NASA or allowable at this time. An alternative to
making the prime contractor the technical integration contractor would have
been to bring in another company whose sole responsibility would be tech-
nical integration. This would undoubtedly be wasteful, introducing much
duplication of effort. (It might be similar to the Boeing TIE contract in
Apollo which was not altogether successful.)
A strong cautionary note must be sounded at this time: There must be
a clear distinction between technical integration and managerial control
integration. While it is reasonable that the prime contractor should assume
wide responsibility as technical integrator, NASA itself, presumably through
its lead center for the program, must maintain full and in-depth control of
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all aspects of the program through its own management and control re-
sources .
NASA's Apollo experience has made it fully capable of such manage-
ment control, and experience has shown that only limited responsibility
should be delegated outside the Agency. If MSC's current manpower is not
great enough to perform this function adequately, then its management
offices must be augmented by transfers from other parts of OMSF whose
in-house capability is surely adequate to the task. NASA's technical
capability is generally acknowledged. Its management expertise is not
always appreciated.
